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Abstract 
Almost two decades after the Barcelona Declaration, the European Union (EU) is still struggling to engage 
positively with its southern neighbours. Security has been the key concern in this relationship, with the EU 
putting forward a short-term agenda, often inconsistent with the policies, institutions and long-term goals of the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This article argues that the so-called Arab Spring has induced a soul-searching 
process within the European institutions that has opened the possibility for Brussels to reinvent its relations with 
the Middle East and North Africa countries, particularly in the field of security. 
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Security is a cent ral concept  in the understanding of Euro-Mediterranean relat ions (see 
e.g. Joffé 2008 and Pace 2010) . Since 1995, with the inst itut ionalisat ion of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) , and later with both the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP)  and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) , the European Union (EU)  has 
developed a myriad of policies and st rategies vis-à-vis its southern neighbours with a 
clear security out look. Such an approach has exposed the lim its of the normat ive 
dimension (Manners 2002)  of the EU’s policy towards its neighbourhood, reinforced the 
status quo in autocrat ic regimes, and placed the EU in a weaker posit ion to influence the 
2011-12 events ( the so-called Arab Spring)  in its Southern neighbourhood. 
This art icle’s claim  is that  the reform s and revolut ions that  occurred and are st ill 
occurr ing in the southern Mediterranean have provided the EU with a unique opportunity 
to press the ‘reset ’ but ton and re-energise its Euro-Mediterranean policy. To do so, it  will 
certainly need to review its security understanding of the region, in part icular whether it  
is willing to accomm odate the security interests of its neighbours in a com m on 
understanding of Euro-Mediterranean security, or whether it  intends to proceed, as it  has 
done, part icular ly since 9/ 11, on a clear path of pr ior it ising short - term  security concerns. 
A prelim inary overview of the EU’s react ion to the events in the region tells us that  such 
a security-paradigm  shift  has, despite the many measures and policies adopted by 
Brussels since 2011, yet  to materialise. 
This art icle first  br iefly addresses the inst itut ional evolut ion of the EU’s relat ion with its 
southern neighbours unt il 2011 from  a security perspect ive. The second part  analyses 
Brussels’s react ion to the Arab Spring, with a focus on the policies and inst ruments 
proposed in order to face the southern Mediterranean’s changing polit ical landscape. 
Finally, the art icle will conclude with som e reflect ions on how the EU m ight  ‘re- frame’ it s 
approach vis-à-vis a post -Arab Spring Middle East  and North Afr ica (MENA)  region. 
 
SECURI TY I N  THE EURO- MEDI TERRANEAN RELATI ONSHI P 
The Euro-Mediterranean relat ionship had its basis in Brussels’s belief that , by creat ing 
the necessary econom ic condit ions, it  would be possible to develop the MENA region and 
ult im ately create a free t rade area in the Mediterranean that  would also be a zone of 
peace and prosperity. This inherent ly liberal project  of security through t rade was first  
at tem pted in the 1970s (Gom ez and Christou 2004:  188) , with the format ion of the 
Global Mediterranean Policy in 1972 (Joffé 2008:  150) . Even though the policy had 
lim ited success, it  m eant  that  the European Com m unity (EC)  was able, for the first  t im e, 
to conceive of the region as a whole (Edmunds 2008) . The polit ical importance at tached 
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to it  was, however, lim ited with the count r ies in the region finding themselves 
‘increasingly m arginalized’ (Gom ez and Christou 2004:  189) . Oddly enough, the m ost  
visible consequence of this rapprochem ent  to the south would be the significant  increase 
of the t rade deficit  of the Mediterranean count r ies with the EC – from four m illion Ecu in 
1973 to nine m illion in 1979 ( idem) . 
With the Cold War and its ideological geopolit ics on the wane, Europe’s interest  in it s 
southern neighbours was reinvigorated. Mult iple init iat ives were created such as the 5+ 5 
init iat ive or the Western European Union (WEU)  Mediterranean Dialogue. Both focused 
on the Maghreb region, which was an area of part icular concern in term s of m igrat ion, as 
m ade clear by an aide of the then French President  Jacques Chirac when he said:  ‘[ i] f we 
don’t  help North Afr ica, North Afr ica will come to us’ (European Voice 1995) . 
Whatever the underlying mot ivat ions or the external percept ions, the success of the Oslo 
Accords in 1993 meant  that  the EU had an ext raordinary opportunity to devise a policy 
encom passing the Maghreb, the Mashreq and I srael.  The start ing point  was not  
part icularly hopeful, given that  Europe’s investment  in the region accounted, in that  
period, for less than three per cent  of the EU’s total, ‘way behind EU investment  in Asia 
and Lat in Am erica’ (European Voice 1995) . However, the establishm ent  of the EMP 
meant  that  the EU would invest  about  two billion USD per year in the region, bringing 
with it  the prom ise of dramat ically shift ing the pat tern of econom ic and financial 
relat ions between both margins of the Mediterranean (Joffé 2005:  38) . I nst itut ionally,  
the partnership would be divided into three ‘baskets’:  polit ical and security;  econom y 
and finances;  and, finally, social, cultural and hum an. Underlying the partnership was 
the neo- liberal ‘logic that  free- t rade, increased private investment  and m acro-econom ic 
reform  would st imulate socio-econom ic development , indust r ial modernisat ion and 
m acro-econom ic reform ’ (Gom ez and Christou 2004:  190) ;  the belief in the economy as 
the answer to security concerns. 
Despite its commercial and economy- related focus, the EMP was, in essence, an EU- led 
security project  (Pace 2010, 433) . The prom ise was to create the condit ions for a 
product ive dialogue between all partners (Soler i Lecha 2010:  234) , an ‘inclusionist  
approach’ (Pace 2010:  432) ;  an approach that  should have resulted in a security area 
defined loosely as the Euro-Mediterranean space. I n pract ice, though, the EMP failed in 
m ost  accounts to ‘live up to the expectat ions’ (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005:  17)  in 
m any sectors, including as a security project , as it  was ‘unable to create [ either]  a safer 
and more stable Euro-Mediterranean space, [ or]  a common narrat ive for Mediterranean 
security’ (Soler i Lecha 2010:  233) . I n that  regard, its inclusionist  understanding of 
security was rapidly replaced ‘by an ‘exclusionist ’ policy, where the reduct ion of illegal 
m igrat ion from  the south [ took]  top prior ity in EU security discourse’ (Pace 2010:  432) . 
The EU adopted a securit ized (see e.g. Buzan et  al. 1998)  approach to the region which 
was often embraced by polit ical leaderships in the South, happy to see their regimes 
reinforced by a securit ized view of their  own society, such as in Tunisia, where President  
Ben Ali took the opportunity to ‘monopolize the polit ical scene’ (Joffé 2008:  158) , while 
repressing ‘dangerous’ I slam ist  movements. This resulted in a ‘stabilit y partnership’ 
convenient  to both the EU and the southern Mediterranean leaders (Behr 2012:  76) . I n 
that  regard, 9/ 11 did not  cont r ibute to a dramat ic change in Europe’s security discourse 
towards the Mediterranean. I t  reinforced it ,  and eventually gave it  a clearer, over-
arching narrat ive within the Global War on Terror (GWOT)  discourse, act ively 
cont r ibut ing to the m acro-securit izat ion of terror ism  (Buzan and Wæver 2009) . However, 
the key features of this discourse had already been defined in the 1990s. 
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THE EU  AND THE POST- 9 / 1 1  MEDI TERRANEAN SECURI TY LANDSCAPE 
The EU’s react ion to 9/ 11 in its Mediterranean neighbourhood led to inst itut ional (both 
internal and external)  and policy changes. The EU’s most  st ructured response to the 
changing security landscape cam e with the definit ion of a security st rategy that  defined 
the main axis of the EU’s external relat ions from  a security standpoint , with a special 
em phasis on its relat ions with the eastern and southern neighbours. I ndeed, the 2003 
European Security St rategy  defined the security of EU’s neighbourhood as one of its 
main st rategic object ives. According to the docum ent  it  was ‘in the European interest  
that  count r ies on our borders are well-governed’ as ‘neighbours who are engaged in 
violent  conflict , weak states where organised cr im e flourishes, dysfunct ional societ ies or 
exploding populat ion growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe’ (2003:  2) . I n 
m ore detail,  the EU expected to ‘prom ote a r ing of well governed count r ies’ with whom it  
could ‘enjoy close and cooperat ive relat ions’ ( idem:  8) . The 2004 European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)  was, to a large extent , the outcome of this security concern. 
Even though the ENP started to be prepared before the presentat ion of the European 
Security St rategy,  it s final version em bodies the concerns stated in that  docum ent  
(Aliboni 2005:  1) . The ENP was init ially proposed by the United Kingdom and Sweden 
(Tassinari 2005:  8)  in November 2002 during a General Affairs and External Relat ions 
session, and again in December during the Copenhagen Sum m it . I n March 2003, the 
European Commission presented Wider Europe – Neighbourhood:  A New Fram ework for 
Relat ions with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours and, one year later, in May 2004, 
the st rategy that  framed the ENP. Through the negot iat ion and implem entat ion of act ion 
plans, it  was expected that  neighbouring count r ies in the east  (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine)  and south (Algeria, Egypt , I srael, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Palest inian Authority and Tunisia)  would move ‘closer to the EU’ (Commission 
2003:  3)  by implement ing measures in areas such as polit ical dialogue and reform ;  
just ice and hom e affairs;  energy, t ransport , informat ion society, environment  and 
research and innovat ion;  and social policy and people- to-people contacts. 
I n pract ice, the access to the EU internal m arket  was the only visible incent ive on offer 
(Tocci 2005:  24) , and there was no clear path on how to get  there. I n the Barcelona 
Process, part  of this path had been delineated by a more integrated southern 
Mediterranean. I n the ENP, the role of regional horizontal cooperat ion was poorly defined 
(Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005)  and ult im ately distant  from  its other clear goal of 
different iat ing between those count r ies that  could progress faster (Balfour and Rot ta 
2005:  13) . Despite stat ing in the 2003 document  that  ‘[ i] n the context  of a new EU 
neighbourhood policy, further regional and sub- regional cooperat ion and integrat ion 
am ongst  the count r ies of the Southern Mediterranean will be st rongly encouraged’ 
(Com m ission 2003:  8) , lit t le was actually done in that  regard. I n short , the EU was not  
offer ing a t rue partnership but  rather a relat ionship based on ‘dependence’ (Leonard, 
2005:  107) . The prospect  of the ENP working as a t r igger for sustainable developm ent  of 
the region was thus lim ited from  the very start  (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005:  20) . 
This, arguably, was further evidence that  the EU was primarily m ot ivated by security and 
not  norm at ive concerns. Security certainly affected the ENP in both discourse and 
pract ice. The EU was, in the wording of the 2003 Commission docum ent  on Wider 
Europe, looking for a joint  approach to address ‘threats to m utual security, whether from 
the t rans-border dim ension of environm ental and nuclear hazards, com m unicable 
diseases, illegal im m igrat ion, t rafficking, organised crime or terror ist  networks’ 
(Commission 2003:  6) . Some of these security issues were repeated in 2007, when the 
Com m ission, again focusing on conflicts, highlighted their  potent ial consequences in 
terms of ‘unmanageable m igratory flows, disrupt ion of energy supply and t rade routes, 
or the creat ion of breeding grounds for terror ist  and cr im inal act ivity of all k inds’ 
(Com m ission 2007a:  6) . This cent rality of the security discourse cont r ibuted to a double 
process of division between high-prior ity and low-prior it y areas of act ion and between 
‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal zones of civilizat ion’, the form er const ituted of the EU m em bers and 
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the lat ter the count r ies responsible for the ‘dir ty work’ (Pace 2010:  432)  of counter-
terror ism . For instance, for the EU, it  was m ore im portant  to focus on Tunisia and 
Egypt ’s cont r ibut ion to its counter- terror ism  policy rather than on how those count r ies 
were perform ing in terms of polit ical reforms. 
By securing a cooperat ive relat ionship with southern Mediterranean regim es, the EU not  
only cont r ibuted to the reproduct ion of the status quo (Balfour 2011) , it  ended up 
‘enabling further insecurity and instability in the south’ (Pace 2010:  432) . The need to 
secure Europe caused European leaders to promote fr iendly relat ions and establish less 
than ethical agreements with regional dictators, such as the 2009 agreement  between 
I taly and Libya, in which the form er was allowed to return m igrants to the lat ter without  
assessing whether they required internat ional protect ion (Vogel 2011) . 
Regarding the division between high and low prior ity areas, a brief content -analysis of 
som e of the act ion plans that  have been approved for the region and respect ive annual 
reviews reveal a tendency to over-emphasise security- related issues, lim it ing the use of 
term s such as dem ocracy or governance to a m inimum. 
 
Table 1:  Security and Dem ocracy in the ENP docum ents 
 Act ion Plan 2 0 0 8  Report  2 0 0 9  Report  2 0 1 0  Report  
ENP Sec. Dem . Sec. Dem . Sec. Dem . Sec. Dem . 
Egypt  36 4 13 4 15 3 13 4 
I srael 19 4 8 4 6 4 9 6 
Morocco 25 3 13 3 13 3 9 7 
Tunisia 28 6 13 6 13 3 13 5 
Total 108 17 47 17 47 13 44 22 
Source:  Comm ission of the European Communit ies (2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2007b, 2008a, 
2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d) . 
 
As seen in table 1, the term  ‘security’ is used much more frequent ly than ‘dem ocracy’ in 
the act ion plans, alm ost  ten t im es m ore in the cases of Morocco and Egypt . There is no 
single case, count ing both the act ion plans and reviews, in which this tendency has been 
reversed. The best  results come from  I srael and Morocco in the 2010 review ( issued in 
2011)  in which they alm ost  reach parity between the two concepts. This m odest  exercise 
does not  allow for an extensive analysis of the content  of these docum ents. I t  does 
however authorise the sim ple conclusion that  security is a concept  disproport ionally 
m ore present  in these docum ents than that  of democracy. 
The creat ion of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)  is, to an extent , the corollary of 
this distorted policy between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours. Underlying the 
establishment  of the UfM was the acknowledgement  of the difficulty in reform ing the 
regimes in the MENA region and the need to re- focus on the developm ent  of technical 
issues (such as m arit im e safety, renewable energy or water storage) , hoping that , in the 
long- term , som e sort  of spillover effect  would allow these count r ies to become more 
democrat ic and free. I t  was an init iat ive act ively promoted by French President  Nicolas 
Sarkozy that  was to include states on both sides of the Mediterranean, but  not  
necessarily other European states. As expected, such an init iat ive was not  part icularly 
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well received in Brussels or other European capitals, and Sarkozy was forced to 
‘Europeanize’ the init iat ive by integrat ing the Euro-Mediterranean Process under the t it le 
Barcelona Process:  Union for the Mediterranean.  The result  has been a ‘stalemate 
vir tually since its [ the UfM]  earliest  stages’ (Am irah-Fernández and Soler i Lecha 2011:  
2) . 
At  the turn of the decade, the EU thus had an ENP in need of deep reform  and a UfM that  
had integrated the EMP, and given it  a m ore funct ionalist  twist . Neither worked 
part icularly well,  but  both showed a deep concern in promot ing the stabilit y of the 
neighbourhood (and, as a logical consequence, Europe’s security) , m ore than its 
dem ocrat isat ion (Dennison and Dworkin 2011:  9) . Almost  two decades after the 
signature of the Euro-Mediterranean Declarat ion, the EU was as unprepared to deal with 
the MENA region as it  was in 1995;  embroiled in a complex web of inst itut ions with lit t le 
polit ical clutch and lim ited appeal to its southern neighbours. That  would be rather 
visible when the first  signs of discontent  gave way to massive demonst rat ions, first  in 
Tunisia, and soon after, across the whole region. 
 
THE ARAB SPRI NG AND THE EU’S RESPONSE 
Europe was taken by surprise with the events t r iggered in North Afr ica that  would 
become known as the Arab Spring. I t  ‘came late and off-balance to the protests, and 
worse, came to the revolut ions without  a shred of unity’ (Torreblanca 2011) . I n addit ion 
to all the shortcom ings in the EU’s Mediterranean policy before 2011, the EU was now 
m ore concerned with its own financial crisis than with the success of the EU-
Mediterranean relat ionship (Behr 2012:  77) . The response was unclear (and slow)  
regarding Tunisia, late in relat ion to Egypt  (Föderl-Schm id 2011) , and st rong-worded but  
ult imately ‘marginal in the process that  ensued’ regarding Libya (Biscop 2012:  75) . The 
same could be said of the conflict  in Syria, where the EU has played a secondary role 
thus far. I n Algeria, Bahrain, Yem en and I raq, the EU refrained from  taking any 
significant  m easures, while it  enthusiast ically endorsed the t im id polit ical reform s 
approved in Morocco and Jordan (Behr 2012:  79) . Two years or so later, the same 
argument  could be used regarding the latest  developm ents in Egypt , with the EU 
support ing the polit ical t ransit ion in the count ry despite Moham ed Morsi’s at tem pt  to 
expand significant ly his execut ive powers (Norman 2013) . 
Some of the European early react ions to the Arab Spring clear ly revealed the full extent  
of the int imacy between repressive regimes and European dem ocracies. For instance, 
French foreign m inister Michèle Alliot -Marie offered Tunisia France’s expert ise on crowd 
cont rol after the first  signs of unrest  in the North Afr ican count ry. A few weeks later, and 
despite the regional unrest , David Cam eron found it  appropriate to head, together with 
more than 30 businessmen, to the Gulf region to promote the UK’s defence indust ry. 
This was not  uncommon, as illust rated by Amnesty I nternat ional’s report  that  in 2011 
several European count r ies sold weaponry to the regimes they were crit icising for using 
excessive violence against  their  own people. Further, a close look at  the 2010 EU 
progress report  on Egypt , for exam ple, reveals that  Cairo was closely working with the 
EU in security- related issues in the m onths preceding Mubarak’s toppling. According to 
the docum ent , Egypt  was now part  of a group of third count r ies with whom  the EU was 
‘to conclude a framework agreement  on their part icipat ion in EU crisis management  
operat ion’. I n addit ion, Egypt  was also act ively working to ‘deepen its cooperat ion’ with 
the EU in counter- terror ism  related issues (EC and HR 2011b:  8) . 
Once more, security concerns, part icularly the potent ial inflow of m igrants, were 
Europe’s major concern as fr iendly regim es tum bled in Tunisia and Egypt . I n a January 
2011 European Council declarat ion (more than a month after the init ial popular 
dem onst rat ions in Tunisia) , the heads of state and governm ent  of the EU expressed, in 
the first  nine points of the declarat ion, their concerns and hopes regarding the unfolding 
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of events in Tunisia, Egypt  and Libya. The following three points were, however, 
dedicated to the problem of m igrat ion movements, in which the European leaders stated 
their ‘support  to improve the cont rol and m anagem ent  of borders and m easures to 
facilitate the return of m igrants to their count r ies of origin’ (European Council 2011:  4) . 
The first  m onths of the Arab Spring therefore revealed the same EU security m ind-set  
that  had marked Euro-Mediterranean relat ions in the previous decade and that , in the 
concrete case of the MENA uprisings, led, in the words of form er President  of the 
European Com m ission Jacques Delors and former European Commissioner António 
Vitor ino, ‘to disproport ionate insistence on the possible negat ive consequences of the 
ongoing ‘revolut ions’, in term s of m igrat ion and radicalizat ion’ (2011) . 
Policy wise, the Arab Spring happened at  a t ime in which the EU was reform ing its ENP, 
for the first  t im e since the Lisbon Treaty cam e into effect . The general revision of the 
policy and the adopt ion of specific measures for the southern Mediterranean were, to an 
extent , part  of the sam e process. Regarding its southern dim ension, there was the 
recognit ion by the EU that  past  m istakes had been m ade. According to European 
Commissioner Stefan Füle, even though the ‘EU has always been act ive in promot ing 
hum an r ights and dem ocracy in our neighbourhood’ it  is also clear that  ‘it  has often 
focused too much on stabilit y at  the expense of other object ives and, more 
problemat ically, at  the expense of our values’. As a result  ‘the t ime to bring our interests 
in line with our [ European]  values’ (2011, 2)  had arr ived. These are part icular ly relevant  
words as they not  only recognise the EU’s wrongdoings (Balfour 2012) , but  they also 
highlight  the m ismatch between the values upheld by the EU and the ways in which it  
at tempted to fulfil it s interests. Sim ilar ly, the European Council President  Herman Van 
Rom puy recognised that  ‘[ b] et t ing on stabilit y alone therefore can not  be the ult im ate 
answer’ (Van Rom puy 2011) . At  stake was not  only the future of EU-Mediterranean 
relat ions, but  also the credibilit y of the EU as a global actor. 
Moving beyond m ere rhetoric, the EU put  forward both a revised ENP and a set  of 
policies part icular ly directed at  the Mediterranean, such as the Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the South Mediterranean, the Dialogue for 
Migrat ion, Mobilit y and Security with the Southern Mediterranean Count r ies, the Support  
for Partnership Reform  and I nclusive Growth (SPRI NG)  programme, and the Civil Society 
Facilit y ( to both the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe) . From the EU standpoint , these 
approaches are to cont r ibute to levelling the playing field between Brussels and its 
neighbours. They are based on a ‘more for m ore’ pr inciple, in which each partner count ry 
has increasing access to the EU’s funding opportunit ies policies as it  fulfills it s reform  
commitments, and on ‘mutual accountability and condit ionality’ (Füle 2011) , in which the 
EU is as accountable to its neighbouring partners as those partners are to the EU. The 
lat ter is supposed to fulfil Brussels’s prom ises based on what  becam e known as the three 
Ms (m oney, m obility and m arkets)  whereas the former are responsible for implement ing 
the reform  com m itm ents negot iated with the EU. According to the official discourse, 
Brussels is act ively involved in support ing these count r ies’ reforms, in an at tempt  to help 
them  build a ‘deep dem ocracy’, of ‘the kind that  lasts’ (EC and HR 2011a:  2) . Moreover, 
the EU has also appointed a Special Representat ive to the region with the aim  of working 
more closely with all the relevant  stakeholders of the t ransit ion and reform  processes 
undergoing in the region. An addit ional (when com pared with the original budget )  EUR 1 
billion was allocated to the ENP (South and East )  to cover these policies and the EU has 
also managed to guarantee addit ional funding lines from other internat ional inst itut ions 
and partner count r ies (part icularly through the G8-Deauville init iat ive) . 
I t  is unclear at  this point  whether these measures will succeed in cont r ibut ing to the 
dem ocrat izat ion of southern Mediterranean or to the st rengthening of t ies between the 
EU and the count r ies in the region. Thus far, and in line with the view of some regional 
experts, the EU is, despite the historical events unfolding in the MENA region, st ill to 
change its neighbourhood paradigm (Behr 2012:  87) . This has consequences. For a 
start , the EU seem s increasingly to have to com pete (and necessarily)  cooperate with 
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other actors in the region:  the Arab Gulf, I ran, Turkey, Russia and China. The 
Mediterranean is no longer ( if it  ever was)  the EU’s backyard, which means that  the EU’s 
policy shortcom ings m ight  result  in someone else’s increased influence in the region. 
Brussels has, to som e extent  understood that , and has developed t ies with the Arab 
League and the Gulf Cooperat ion Council (GCC) and is, through the Special 
Representat ive, at tem pt ing to provide a permanent  dialogue with regional stakeholders. 
I t  does however seem to lack the will and the policy imaginat ion to guarantee a 
significant  influent ial role next  to its southern neighbours. 
For all the rhetoric, both the new and the amended policy frameworks within which it  
relates to the region remain unbalanced (maintaining a vert ical relat ionship between 
Brussels and its neighbours) ;  underfunded (part icular ly when compared with the values 
the GCC is invest ing in the region) ;  and if anything, more complex and difficult  to 
understand for the com m on cit izen on both sides of the Mediterranean (who often do not  
how to benefit  from  the opportunit ies provided by the EU’s credit  lines as a result  of the 
involvement  of so many councils, groups, policies and plans) . 
I n security term s, there rem ains a one-sided understanding of the r isks and challenges 
both sides face. For instance, in the recent ly presented Support ing closer cooperat ion 
and regional integrat ion in the Maghreb:  Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia,  
the Commission and the High Representat ive ident ified as one of the main challenges 
facing the Maghreb, ‘Global Threats’, that  correspond to the Al Qaida threat  in the 
Maghreb and Sahel region. I t  is puzzling why in a docum ent  dedicated to the Maghreb it  
was necessary to include a sub-sect ion on ‘global’ threats;  m ore so that  the EU finds it  
acceptable to ident ify what  is a ‘paramount  concern in the [ Maghreb]  region’ as if it  
belonged to it ;  as if it  could speak for the whole region. This is the type of prescript ive 
analysis that  has informed the Euro-Mediterranean relat ionship since its ear ly days and 
that  has qualitat ively to change if the EU is to remain a credible partner in the region. 
 
REVAMPI NG THE EURO- MEDI TERRANEAN RELATI ONSHI P: OLD W I NE I N  NEW  
BOTTLES? 
Concerned with the potent ial flux of refugees, anxious about  the establishm ent  of 
theocracies in the neighbourhood, crudely honest  about  its less than ethical relat ions 
with some of the now deposed regimes, and most ly focused on sort ing out  it s own 
internal financial problems, the EU took some t im e to react  in a concerted m anner to the 
unfolding Arab Spring. As seen above, the EU responses have involved a good degree of 
self-censorship and an enhanced reform-orientated discourse. Translat ing it  into a 
coherent  approach towards the region will certainly be a complex and long process. The 
fact  that  this is the first  at tem pt  to renew the inst itut ional relat ionship after the Lisbon 
Treaty cam e into force will potent ially allow for a more competent  handling of the issues 
and policies at  stake (EC and HR 2011a:  1) . Having the tools and the policies, it  remains 
to be seen how effect ive these new policies will turn out  to be. So far, the results are far 
from  perfect . 
The problems are wide and deep, start ing with the EU’s lack of inst itut ional creat ivit y 
when dealing with its southern neighbours. The EU has largely reproduced the same 
‘solut ions’ it  has been offer ing since the onset  of the Barcelona Process:  pr ivileged 
access to market , incent ives for market  liberalisat ion, south-south cooperat ion, a 
different iated approach between count r ies (a principle included in the 2004 ENP) , st rong 
rhetorical but  lim ited financial support  to civil society init iat ives (Behr 2012, 83) . 
As argued by Krist ina Kauch, ‘[ i] I f the EU is to preserve its influence in the MENA over 
the com ing decade, it  m ust  com e up with som ething qualitat ively new’ (2012:  2) ;  it  will 
have to support  ‘the broader goal of popular empowerment ’ while avoiding assessing it  
from  a supposedly ‘fixed European polit ical m odel’ (Dennison and Dworkin 2011:  3) . This 
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will require Brussels to accept  it  must  deal with polit ical part ies of different  backgrounds, 
including conservat ive I slam ic ones, if necessary. I n order to do so, it  is crucial for the 
EU to fine- tune its balance between security and reform . 
The issue is more complicated than a mere t rade-off, given that  m em ber states will 
certainly not  accept  jeopardising their security for what  they see as potent ially 
destabilising polit ical movements that  ult imately m ight  not  cooperate in security related 
m at ters. But  again, the issue is also not  just  about  the fear of I slam ic part ies and their  
potent ially negat ive consequences. I ndeed, the problem  is the same today as in 1995 
and the Barcelona Process:  what  security and for whom ? I n that  field, the EU rem ains 
most ly focused on guaranteeing the lat ter instead of meaningfully consider ing the 
form er. I t  is t im e to press the reset  but ton. 
 
* * *  
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